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The impact of an experimental guaranteed income on crime and violence
Abstract: Would unconditional cash payments reduce crime and violence? This paper examines
data on crime and violence in the context of an understudied social experiment from the late
1970s called the Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment, or Mincome. We combine townlevel crime statistics for all medium-sized Canadian Prairie towns with town-level sociodemographic data from the census to study how an experimental guaranteed income affected
both violent crime and total crime. We find a significant negative relationship between Mincome
and both outcomes. We also decompose total crime and analyze its main components, property
crime and “other” crime, and find a significant negative relationship between Mincome and
property crime. While the impact on property crime is theoretically straightforward, we close by
speculating on the mechanisms that might link the availability of guaranteed annual income
payments to a decline in violence, focusing on the mechanisms that shape patterns of interpartner violence.
Keywords: Guaranteed Annual Income; Basic Income; Crime; Violence

The upper five have twenty baubles and bangles a plenty
The bottom twenty have five just enough to stay alive
When the pie’s in such a plight better lock your door at night
- Quoted in Holmberg, 1971

1. Introduction
What is the impact of economic resources on crime and violence? Would unconditional cash
payments reduce property crime? Could it reduce violent crime? Although the guaranteed
income experiments (GAI) of the 1970s (see Levine et al. 2005; Munnell 1986; and Widerquist
2005) provided an opportunity to explore these questions, attention at the time was concentrated
primarily on labor market consequences (e.g., Burtless 1986; Hum and Simpson 1993) and
secondarily on “marital dissolution” (e.g., Cain 1986; Cain and Wissoker 1990a, 1990b; Hannan
and Tuma 1990). By contrast, the experimental guaranteed annual income literature produced
1
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only one preliminary analysis on the subject of crime and violence (Groeneveld, Short, and
Thoits 1979). The dearth of analysis is surprising because insufficient economic resources are a
central driver of criminality (Rosenfeld and Fornago 2007; Rosenfeld and Messner 2013). And
because the GAI effectively eliminates poverty, it seems plausible to expect it to reduce crime,
particularly property crime. But the impact of a guaranteed income might extend beyond
property crime to violent forms of crime. For instance, insofar as risk of a violent incident is
heightened by financial stress and financial conflict in the family, and insofar as the guaranteed
income reduces financial stress, we should expect inter-partner violence to fall. The guaranteed
income might reduce other kinds of violent crime, too, if they are correlated with property
crimes, as is often the case (Messner and Rosenfeld 2012; Rosenfeld 2009).
While these mechanisms seem plausible, and the subject matter is highly relevant to a full
and “social” cost-benefit analysis of the guaranteed income, both the academic literature that
emerged out of these experiments and the subsequent popular debate framed these issues in an
exceedingly narrow fashion. Despite changes in familial and economic life since the 1970s,
lessons from these unique multimillion dollar experiments remain important for the
contemporary debate, especially as economic insecurity (Kalleberg 2018) continues to play a
major role in family dynamics and the social fallout of high-inequality regimes (Atkinson 2015;
Grusky and MacLean 2015) remains largely unaddressed.
This paper returns to the GAI experiments, focusing on an understudied experiment
called the Manitoba Basic Annual Income Experiment (1975–1977), or Mincome, and expands
the discussion of the GAI to a set of issues that are broader than those usually considered.
Mincome participants were able to access a GAI equivalent to about $19,500 CAD (2014
dollars) for a family of four. Unlike a universal basic income, which phases out in its net impact
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(here, equal payments are issued to each citizen, but tax liabilities rise with market incomes and
steadily exceed payments), guaranteed income payments phase out directly as market incomes
rise. Nonetheless, the two policies are quite similar in their economic effects. Both can achieve
the identical post-tax-and-transfer income distribution, and work-unconditionality means that
both make exits from work and marriage more feasible than they would otherwise be.
While Mincome took place in three sites, this study focuses on the so-called “saturation”
site located in the town of Dauphin, Manitoba, where all town residents were eligible for
Mincome payments. Unlike more common experimental designs that randomize individuals or
families who receive benefits, this distinctive town-level experiment design allows us to ask
macro-social questions, including how treatment effects spill over and affect community-level
processes (Calnitsky and Latner 2017; Calnitsky 2019). Mincome was completely unique with
respect to this design feature. All other GAI experiments, including the ones now underway—for
example, in Stockton, California (Martin-West et al 2019), Finland (Kangas 2016), and the
Netherlands (McFarland 2017)—were set up as randomized controlled trials, which make macrosocial questions unaskable by design, as recipients represent a tiny percentage of the town or city
population. While these new experiments can in principle inquire into crime and intimate partner
violence, they are simply unable to examine how a guaranteed income might impact those
phenomena by way of shaping social interactions and society more broadly. These questions are
highlighted in the literature on peer effects and crime (Carrington 2002; Glaeser, Sacerdote, and
Scheinkman 1996; Reiss 1980; Sah 1991). Insofar as people are impacted by social life, this is a
serious shortcoming of the new experiments.
There are good reasons to seek out social experiments to study the relationship between
economic resources and crime. The virtue of an experiment is the ability to link outcomes with a
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fundamentally exogenous cause, in this case the availability of Mincome payments. The
Mincome experiment is essentially a kind of external shock to people’s incomes, and as such we
have a strong case to make a causal argument about its impact on a range of variables. For the
case of inter-partner violence, for instance, there is solid evidence linking it to economic
hardship and financial stress (Benson et al. 2003; Gelles 1997; Golden, Pereira, and Durrance
2013; Halliday Hardie and Lucas 2010); but these individual-level analyses typically cannot rule
out the possibility that some third unmeasured variable caused both economic hardship and interpartner abuse. By bringing experimental evidence to debates about the relationship between
income and different forms of crime, our analysis improves the robustness of the causal claims in
this literature.
This paper uses town-level crime statistics on Dauphin and all similarly sized Prairie
towns, merged with sociodemographic controls obtained from census data. We analyze this timeseries data using a difference-in-difference regression that includes town and year fixed effects.
These analyses test whether changes in crime rates in Dauphin, the treatment site, deviate from
other Prairie towns during the Mincome experiment. Our results show a robust and significant
negative relationship between the guaranteed income and both violent crime rates and total crime
rates. We also decompose total crime and analyze its main components, property crime and
“other” crime, and find a significant negative relationship between Mincome and property crime.
While commentators have often speculated on these relationships, this is the first paper to use
data from a rich country to provide evidence for them.1

For a recent working paper on income changes and intimate partner violence in Kenya, see Haushofer et
al. (2019). Although they were published too recently to be included, new studies have used the Alaska
Permanent Dividend Fund—which annually distributes a small but universal basic income of one to two
thousand dollars to (almost) every citizen—to study the impact on crime. See Watson, Guettabi, and
Reimer (2019) and Dorsett (2019).
1

4

Page 5 of 45

Social Problems

2. Mincome
Before examining the data it is necessary to provide some background context to the Mincome
experiment. Mincome was concocted in response to a cluster of reports that publicized the extent
and depth of poverty in Canada in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Economic Council of
Canada (Canada 1968) and the Department of National Health and Welfare (Canada 1970)
presented the guaranteed annual income as an intriguing idea meriting serious consideration.
These initial volleys in Canada’s war on poverty were followed by the “Croll” Report (1971), a
document on par with the British Beverage Report, and which posed the guaranteed income as
the central policy solution of the era, an idea “whose time has come” (Canada 1971:175). A
group of its writers defected from the Croll team and published their own “renegade report,” The
Real Poverty Report (Adams et al. 1971), which was meant to denounce the bourgeois
conception of poverty espoused in the Croll Report. Nonetheless, exactly like the Croll Report, it
went on to advance the guaranteed income as the natural solution to their more expansive
conception of poverty (see McCormack 1972). The bourgeois researchers of the era and their
radical critics were both converging on the same systemic solutions to poverty. They were
inspired directly by four similar experiments in the US, and it was hoped that Mincome would
demonstrate the feasibility of the guaranteed income to the Canadian public.
The project was approved and the Mincome experiment was rolled out. Dauphinites were
offered guaranteed incomes equivalent to $19,500 for a four-person household.2 Families that for
whatever reason had no labor market income could access the full guarantee, which was about 38
percent of median family income (a measure that excludes relatively low-income “non-family
This figure is adjusted from the 1976 payment guarantee and presented, like all figures, in 2014 CAD
dollars.
2
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persons”), or 49 percent of median household income in 1976. At a negative income tax rate of
50 percent, people could always increase their incomes by working: every dollar of labor market
earnings reduced the guarantee by 50 cents, which meant that payments were phased out entirely
once earnings reached $39,000.3 To put these payment figures in perspective: real median
household income for Dauphin and its rural municipality was only $24,758, and median family
income was $39,166, according to the 1971 census. By the middle of the experiment in 1976, we
estimate that real median household and family incomes were $39,382 and $51,055,
respectively.4 Guarantee levels varied by family size and composition. By accounting for
economies of scale in the home, the payment structure was designed to avoid advantaging one or
another family size (Hikel and Harvey 1973; Hum, Laub, and Powell 1979). This scheme,
regardless of the precise accuracy in accounting for economies of scale, made real the possibility
of exiting bad or abusive relationships.
The project, however, was underfunded; but rather than reducing incomes to households,
the analysis side of Mincome was completely cut. No final report was produced, and most of the
survey data collected on Dauphin has never been analyzed. Subsequent to the end of the
Mincome experiment, a small number of journal articles were produced from the digitized
Winnipeg data (Choudhry and Hum 1995; Hum and Choudhry 1992; Hum and Simpson 1993;
Prescott, Swidinsky, and Wilton 1986; Simpson and Hum 1991); however, until recently no
published research has examined the original survey records (Calnitsky 2016, 2018a; Calnitsky
and Latner 2017) or administrative data (Forget 2011) on the Dauphin portion of the experiment.

Positive tax liabilities were rebated too; the rebate faded to zero once market earnings reached around
$43,400.
4 In a town with a population of 8,885, along with a 3,165-person rural municipality, at least 18 percent—
2,128 individuals, or 706 households—received benefits at some point throughout the program. (This is a
lower bound because available data excludes late-joining farm families; an estimate of this group
increases the participant count to 2,457, or 20 percent of the population.)
3
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As with the U.S. studies, the primary axis of the demonstration concerned the potential
effects on labor supply; broader social questions about the impact of giving people money were
deemed secondary or not asked at all. However, the early academic documents and reports
influencing the design and execution of Mincome showed demonstrable learning from the U.S.
experiments (Atkinson, Cutt, and Stevenson 1973; Hikel and Harvey 1973). In particular, they
insisted on a more expansive vision of the role played by poverty in social life.5 Likewise,
relative to their American counterparts, the question of people’s wellbeing was framed in broader
terms. Indeed, one early Canadian guaranteed annual income planning document ventured some
hypotheses related to crime:
Furthermore, insofar as the guaranteed annual income releases family members—
particularly mothers—from work, we expect that greater parental control and attention in
family relations will reduce the incidence of juvenile delinquency, and increase, as
already mentioned, levels of educational achievement for children of recipient families.
We hypothesize, therefore: Records of children of recipient families involved in
misdemeanors and criminal activity will decrease in the period after as compared to the
period before the introduction of a guaranteed annual income programme in the
community (Atkinson et al. 1973, p. 236).

The authors hypothesize further that:
Inasmuch as the guaranteed annual income increases the ability of the poor to participate
in community organizations and to enjoy a standard of living closer to that of the
community average, we expect that the incidence of crime and mental health problems
will decrease in the poorer sections of the community. We hypothesize, therefore:
Records of crime and mental health problems for recipient families will decrease in the
period after as compared to the period before the introduction of guaranteed annual
income programme in the community (Atkinson et al. 1973, p. 236).
Indeed, Marx and Weber were occasionally consulted. One early report includes the following: “[W]e
now stress the importance of seeing poverty in broader focus. Four basic dimensions of insufficiency and
deprivation can be usefully distinguished—wealth, status, power, and self-fulfillment. Marx has forced us
to see these phenomena as interrelated, and, in the final analysis, perhaps determined by wealth, but
Weber has properly demanded their analytic independence, and the evaluation of their empirical
interrelationships. At any rate, this monograph takes the position that the choice of policy to alleviate
poverty must be based on evidence that some programme has an optimal effect on increasing the standard
of living of the poor in each of these four dimensions” (Atkinson et al. 1973, p. 6).
5
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A somewhat more holistic understanding of poverty, and of familial wellbeing, led to a
broader research design, one including a “saturation” site, Dauphin. It also led to a more wideranging use of research tools, including ethnographers and an array of survey instruments. For
our purposes, a saturation site is relevant because it makes possible a macro-level analysis of
changes in aggregate crime and violence. Nonetheless, while there was an interest in broader
social questions, there are no further references to violence or crime in the Mincome
documentation. Much like the rest of GAI experimental literature that we review next, these
issues were left largely unexplored. And apart from research focused directly on marital
dissolution, so too were questions about the impact of changing family dynamics on inter-partner
abuse.

3. Crime, Violence, and Cash
An important hypothesis suggested by advocates of basic income is that income guarantees may
be inversely correlated with a range of crimes (Offe 1992). This thinking supposes that crime
declines with material deprivation because as marginalization disappears so should its associated
social pathologies. However, there is a counter-hypothesis suggesting that insofar as crime has
roots in “idleness” (i.e., Jacob and Lefgren 2003), which perhaps is fostered by basic income, we
should expect crime to grow. The reasoning is at least as old as the Book of Proverbs: idle hands
are the devil’s workshop. This counter-hypothesis should not be dismissed out of hand; the link
between idleness and crime is not the sole province of editorial pages and eighteenth-century
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political pamphlets.6 For example, sociologists Sara MacLanahan and Gary Sandefur argued that
“idleness and inactivity are a sign of problems to come. Young adults who are not attached to the
labor force or who work only intermittently may not develop the skills necessary for achieving
economic security and social success later on. Being idle is also often associated with crime and
drug or alcohol abuse” (1994, p. 21).7 While it may be the case that limited economic
opportunities explain both idleness and crime, it is at least possible that, following MacLanahan
and Sandefur, basic income could bring about an increase in criminal behavior.
Despite this, from a rational choice perspective (Becker 1968) the former theory may be
the most straightforward and plausible: a causal link between poverty and property crime exists
because reducing poverty reduces the benefit-to-cost ratio of committing crimes. The
mechanism, stated more plainly, says that a society that gives people fewer reasons for crime
will see fewer committed. Several studies suggest this to be the case (Chiu and Madden, 1998;
Hannon 2002; Kelly 2000; Messner and Rosenfeld 2006; Pratt and Cullen 2005; Savolainen
2000), but evidence using experimental designs, such as the GAI, is limited.
Groeneveld et al. (1979) attempted a test using preliminary data from the Seattle and
Denver GAI experiments. While the examination was not followed up on, the early analysis
revealed little impact. Perhaps the closest evidence comes from a study that can be interpreted as
mimicking a basic income experiment.8 Akee et al. (2010) track children in households where

“To be idle,” Samuel Johnson wrote, “is to be vicious” (1968, p. 145). In a similar vein, Jeremy
Bentham saw the workhouse as a “mill to grind rogues honest and idle men industrious” (cited in Polanyi,
2001, p. 126).
7 There are other social science papers that purport to demonstrate, or are interpreted as demonstrating a
causal link between idleness and crime; see, for example Jacob and Lefgren (2003), Anderson et al.,
(2000), Snyder and Sickmund (1999), and Allan and Steffensmeier (1989).
8 Another potential example comes from a ten-month BI pilot project that was conducted by a Lutheran
Bishop and two Lutheran missionaries in 2008 in Otjivero-Omitara, Namibia, where residents under 60
years of age received a modest monthly grant. One report finds a 42 percent drop in the overall crime rate,
while “stock theft” and “other theft” fell by 43 and 20 percent, respectively (Haarmann 2009).
6
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incomes are increased exogenously through a governmental transfer program (alongside
controls). Midway through a study of mental health in North Carolina, which was collecting data
on American Indian and non-Indian children, a casino opened on the Eastern Cherokee
reservation and began to distribute, unconditionally, a per capita portion of casino profits to tribal
members. Researchers found that treatment children had a statistically significant, 22 percent
lower risk of committing minor offenses.9
Although much criminology literature accepts a direct and unmediated relationship
between economic deprivation and property crime, the link between economic variables and
violent crime is more elusive, usually operating through various mediating or conditional
variables (Arvanites and Defina 2006; Rosenfeld and Messner 2013). Some articles show direct
associations between economic deprivation and violence (Shihadeh and Ousey 1998), as well as
inequality and violence (Kelly 2000); both bodies of literature propose underlying mechanisms
that could be at play during the Mincome experiment.
Studies on the relationship between inequality and violent crime propose mechanisms
that involve relative deprivation and social cohesion. Kelly’s (2000) study of rising inequality
and violent crime is furnished with a causal story that appeals to classic “strain” theories
originally associated with Robert Merton (1938), and more recently with Robert Agnew (2005).
For Agnew and Merton, low-status individuals are frustrated when confronted by the relative
privilege of those around them, and are at higher risk of committing crimes (for further empirical
support, see Blau and Blau 1982; and Rebellon et al. 2009). Other criminologists have attempted
to explain the positive correlation between income inequality and violent crime through what
they call “institutional-anomie theory” (Rosenfeld and Messner 2013). The theoretical claim here
Also worth mentioning here is the Moving to Opportunity randomized experiment: a move to a lowpoverty neighborhood reduced criminal behavior by teens (Ludwig, Duncan, and Hirschfield 2001).
9
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is that in more market-dominated societies the norms around means and ends becomes upended;
the moral status of the means selected to achieve different ends become increasingly irrelevant
with marketization.10 These authors find empirical support from studies showing significant
relationships between rates of violent crime and “decommodification” measures based on social
welfare policy (Rosenfeld and Messner 2013; Savolainen 2000). Although the mechanisms may
be different, this school of thought also invokes a link between institutions that soften the impact
of market inequalities and society-wide levels of uncertainty. They point to the spike in violence
in post-Soviet Russia, arguing that it can be explained by the unease and uncertainty facing
citizens as the social safety net abruptly unraveled (Pridemore et al. 2007). Despite a
proliferation of approaches, in recent years there has emerged a “consensus of doubt” (Chiricos
1987; Bushaway 2010; Rosenfeld 2010) surrounding the precise mechanisms linking the
economy and violence.
One underexplored but seemingly plausible approach to thinking about the economyviolence dynamic may be to examine the relationship between the guaranteed income and interpartner violence. Intimate partner violence accounts for a sizeable share of violent crime. At the
time of Mincome, Statistics Canada published a report stating that assaults made up a large
portion of violent crime and that most of these offences were domestic in nature, frequently the
result of family disputes (1977).11 The data we analyze below supports this claim. For the years
that we can disaggregate violent crime (only 1972–1973), we see that assaults accounted for 89
to 96 percent of the crimes of violence in Dauphin. Even if only half of these assaults were cases

Although this claim is made by philosophers like Michael Sandel (2012), it is not clear that the general
conviction is supported by ethnographic and experimental evidence (Henrich et al. 2004).
11 Statistics Canada’s 1977 statement reads: “There were 101,861 assaults reported during 1977... This
offence continues to represent the largest number of crimes reported in the violent crime group… Many
of these offences are domestic in nature, frequently the result of family disputes which can be cleared by
police other than by charge when the victim/complainant refuses to prosecute” (1977).
10
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of intimate partner violence, any changes in the dynamics of this type of violence would likely
leave a notable imprint on overall violent crime rates. These patterns strongly suggest that, even
though intimate partner violence is systematically and massively underreported (Johnson and
Dawson 2011), it is very likely to be an underappreciated driver of violent crime rates—and also
a plausible candidate for the kind of violence that might be impacted by Mincome.
Intimate partner violence is a complex, multicausal phenomenon, which we do not
attempt to comprehensively address in this paper (for overviews, see Johnson 1996; Johnson and
Dawson 2011). It is one piece of the broader phenomena of gendered violence and violence
against women, which comprise forms of violence rooted in heterosexist gender beliefs and are
motivated by the desire to maintain women’s subordination to men’s authority, among other
aspects of gender relations (Manne 2017; Walby 1990). Intimate partner violence is widespread
but extensively underreported, in large part because the cultural and legal environment
systematically undermines survivors’ credibility (Johnson and Dawson 2011). While intimate
partner violence has systemic features, research has shown that patterns of incidence are often
aggravated by poverty and deprivation, conditions which Mincome sought to eliminate.
Research on intimate partner violence has found a consistent pattern linking economic
hardship to higher levels of inter-partner violence (Gelles 1997; Golden et al. 2013). In Canada, a
statistical profile on family violence (Bunge and Levett 1998) isolated low income as a key
correlate of spousal assault in observational data. There are several mechanisms through which
lower economic resources generate higher incidences of intimate partner violence. We identify
three. The first is financial stress: couples facing greater economic insecurity experience more
stress, which may give rise to situational violence (Cunradi, Caetano, and Schafer 2002). Female
respondents to Statistics Canada’s one-off Violence Against Women Survey frequently cited
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stress over finances when asked open-ended questions about how violent incidents usually begin
(Bunge and Levett 1998). In the literature, this is sometimes referred to as the “income” effect
(Hannan, Tuma, and Groeneveld 1978), where an exogenous increase in incomes reduces
financial stress and serves to improve relationship dynamics. Thus, (1) inasmuch as the risk of a
violent incident is heightened by financial stress and financial conflict in the family, Mincome, as
a policy that reduces financial stress, may reduce inter-partner assault.
Additional mechanisms connecting economic resources with intimate partner violence
emphasize how economic dependency increases vulnerability. The lack of independent economic
resources is one important reason why women stay in unhealthy or violent relationships (on this
literature, see Cancian and Meyer 2014; Hannan et al. 1978; Oppenheimer 1988). Economic
dependency also lowers bargaining power within partnerships, and this increases vulnerability to
violence by making threats to leave less credible (Johnson 1996). Thus, Mincome payments
could provide women a way out of abusive relationships through separation or divorce and could
also change the power balance interior to the relationship, thereby fostering better and healthier
relationships. The latter point may be important inasfar as inter-partner violence is rooted in
gender-based power inequalities. The two potential mechanisms here, therefore, are the
following: (2) Mincome reduces exposure to violence by increasing women’s ability to exit from
marriages, and (3) Mincome reduces violence by shifting domestic bargaining power and
increasing women’s power to threaten to exit.
To summarize, the literature reviewed above leads to two general hypotheses:
(1) Mincome ought to be associated with a decline in total crime. This reduction is
expected to be partly driven by a decline in the benefit-to-cost ratio of engaging in
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property crime, but also by a reduction in other forms of crime that are often associated
with property crime and with poverty more generally.
(2) Mincome ought to be associated with a decline in violent crime. We expect violent
crime to decline as a result of declines in both violent crimes linked to property crime and
also declines in assault, which are largely comprised of cases of intimate partner
violence.

4. Analysis plan, data and methods
We draw on the potential outcomes framework (Morgan and Winship 2015) and define our
outcome of interest as the difference between crime rates in Dauphin (the treatment site) and the
unobserved counterfactual—or crime rates that would have been observed in Dauphin if
Mincome had not been implemented. Following other studies on macro-policy interventions,
including the Alaska Permanent Fund’s cash dividend (Jones and Marinescu 2018), we
approximate this unobserved counterfactual using data from similar settings and compare
change-over-time trends. The key substantive question is whether Mincome made Dauphin’s
crime trends deviate from its neighbors’ trends, under the assumption that Dauphin’s crime rates
would have followed those of other towns had the experiment not occurred. Our identification
method, detailed further below, uses a multiyear difference-in-difference estimator that relies on
within-town over-time variation in crime rates and is adjusted for other town-level time-varying
demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.
We obtained town-level crime data from Statistics Canada’s Uniform Crime Reporting
surveys, which contain information on different types of crime on a yearly basis for all Canadian
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towns and municipalities.12 We analyze data for all (N=15) Manitoba and Saskatchewan towns
with mid-1970s populations between 5,000 and 50,000, using data on crimes of violence as well
as overall crime, from the point of availability in 1972 to various municipal boundary changes
after 1980. All our analyses rely on these reported crime statistics, which do not cover the full
universe of crime. Some underreporting is common in all forms of crime but, as noted above,
underreporting is highly prevalent in the realm of intimate partner violence. Because our analysis
relies on change-scores, underreporting would bias our estimates only if it was affected by
treatment or if trends in underreporting did not linearly map onto crime prevalence trends. In the
case of certain forms of gender-based violence for which data is available, previous comparisons
of survey and administrative crime show that the two sources tend to follow the same trends,
even though rates are much higher in survey data than in administrative data (Kruttschnitt,
Kalsbeek, and House 2014), thus minimizing the second potential source of bias. With respect to
the first source of bias, we have no reason to expect Mincome to affect crime underreporting.
Thus, although our analyses can only speak of reported crime rates, this data is regularly used
and we believe these results can reasonably extrapolate to crime trends more generally.
Our analyses include four main dependent variables: overall crime rate, violent crime
rate, property crime rate, and other crime rate. Ideally, we would like to have further
disaggregated data, in particular for violent crime, but this data is unfortunately not available. As
noted above, however, assaults constitute the vast majority of violent crimes; the remainder
includes murder, attempted murder, rape, and robbery. We disaggregate overall crime into its
two largest parts, property crime and “other” crime; together they usually make up around seven-

This data is comprised of police statistics based on a nationwide system of uniform crime reporting
using standard definitions for similar activities.
12
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eighths of the total (with violent crime comprising most of the rest).13 We then separately
analyze these two subcategories in order to see the stronger driver of changes in total crime.
Property crimes include breaking and entering, theft, and auto theft; “other” crimes include a
range of items that sometimes fall in between violent crime and property crime but are not neatly
captured by either: arson, bail violation, counterfeit currency, disturbing the peace, escaping
custody, indecent acts, kidnapping, prostitution, trespassing, and mischief.
We combine this data with census information on sociodemographic characteristics for
each Prairie town. The purpose of these variables is to adjust for shifts in sociodemographic
composition that could affect the outcomes of interest. For instance, if all towns except for
Dauphin were shedding young people and this led to increases in crime rates, we would be at risk
of overestimating or even misattributing Dauphin’s hypothetically lower crime rates to
Mincome. Census data is available only for 1971, 1976, and 1981, and we linearly interpolate
data for the intervening years; otherwise no data is missing.14
The first set of census controls is a proxy for population-level changes in socioeconomic
status, which are common correlates of crime and violence (Bunge and Levitt 1998; Johnson and
Dawson 2011). We use the rate of labor-force participation, average family income, and
percentage of high-school graduates. Age is also a common correlate of offending and
victimization (Johnson and Dawson 2011), and as such, we include the percentage of the

The balance is almost entirely made up of crimes of violence, but there are usually a handful of
violations of federal statutes as well.
14 There is a concern that our results could be sensitive to interpolation. Ideally, we would have
sociodemographic information for all years, as we do for crime data, but this is not available. We assess
this concern in a couple of ways. First, we checked trends in sociodemographic characteristics and
observed no large or potentially concerning patterns. Second, we tested the robustness of our results to
analyses that do not use interpolation and use only years for which we have census data. The main results
are robust to this specification (available upon request), as would be expected. We note, however, that
those analyses are less valid than these presented here because they lump together changes that happen
before and after the experiment, making them less accurate.
13
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population between 20 and 24. Given our interest in the inter-partner violence hypothesis, we
include a second set of correlates that measure women’s relationship status (Jewkes 2002;
Johnson and Hotton 2003). These variables may predict intimate partner violence for a variety of
reasons: they may capture, for example, the degree of women’s social isolation or social network
support (Michalski 2004), or their exposure to intimate partner violence. Here we include the
percentage of single-female households and the percentage of divorced females. We also include
the ratio of female-to-male average incomes as a proxy for the degree of asymmetry in the
domestic power structure, which is sometimes seen as a risk factor for violence in relationships
(Heise 1998).
The estimation method we employ is based on town-level fixed-effects regression models
to test whether Mincome has an effect on the outcomes of interest. Fixed-effects regression
models are equivalent to difference-in-difference estimators when studies contain two survey
waves, and they produce a treatment effect average across waves when studies contain more than
two survey waves, as is our case (Allison 2009). Fixed-effects regressions leverage only withinunit variation, thus eliminating biases driven by stable and unobserved heterogeneity between
units (e.g., idiosyncrasies in local policing, fixed cultural differences, or baseline poverty levels).
Additionally, we include time-period fixed-effects to control for time-varying heterogeneity that
is uniform across units (e.g., changes in agricultural prices, provincial crime trends, economic
trends, or provincial policy changes). This provides an unbiased estimate of Mincome’s causal
effect under the assumption that there are no relevant sources of unobserved time-varying
heterogeneity, also known as the parallel trends assumption. The standard equation we use is as
follows:
𝑌𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1 𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3 𝑆𝑖𝑡𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4 𝑍𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡
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Yit is the outcome variable at time t, M is Mincome, S identifies the study period, and Z
captures the time-varying covariates. Mincome is a dummy variable that identifies treatment for
town-years, equaling 1 when the town received Mincome payments in a given year. Dauphin
during the Mincome years is the treatment, and all other town-years across 15 other Prairie towns
form the control. Yit refers to town-level crime in each year, and β3 tests whether each town’s
crime rate of change varies when Mincome is present. More specifically, it tests whether
Dauphin’s crime rate of change during Mincome is different from that of other similar towns.
Applying the fixed-effects transformation means that all variables are demeaned: each value
corresponds to the deviation from the town-specific mean. We also test the robustness of our
results using placebo tests and synthetic control methods, which we discuss below.
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for crime rates and other sociodemographic
characteristics. On average, Dauphin’s violent crime rate was about 600 per 100,000 people
between 1972 and 1980, a rate lower than other similar Prairie towns that averaged about 800
violent crimes per 100,000 people. Total crime rates are, naturally, much higher than rates of
violence, averaging about 8,000 per 100,000 for Dauphin, and 10,000 per 100,000 for other
Prairie towns. Property crime rates amount to nearly half of the total crime rates. Other variables
show that Dauphin had fewer women in the labor force and fewer divorces, while it resembled
comparable towns in all other variables. Note that any changes in these variables are included
among the controls, and any stable differences across sites do not impact our results because
fixed-effects estimators rely exclusively on within-town variation.
<Table 1 about here>

18

Page 19 of 45

Social Problems

Figure 1 shows crime rate trends in Dauphin, towns with 5,000–25,000 people, Brandon
(the only town with a population between 25,000–50,000), and Manitoba. We include vertical
lines to indicate key dates in Mincome implementation. Baseline and screener interviews started
at the beginning of 1974 (for which people were given a nominal payment) and had the effect of
advertising the program which formally began right before Christmas. Mincome’s first payments
were issued December 1, 1974 and continued in full effect for all of 1975, 1976, and 1977. We
plot annual change in crime rates indexed at 1972. Starting from the top-left going clockwise,
panels show overall crime, violent crime, property crime, and other crime. Figure 1 offers
descriptive support for the hypothesis that Mincome reduced crime levels. Before Mincome,
Dauphin’s crime rate trends were similar to those of other towns, and they only started deviating
when Mincome was implemented. This pattern is most noticeable in violent crime rates, but also
clear in all other crime rates.
<Fig. 1 about here>

5. Results
We begin our analysis by examining the association between Mincome and rates of violence.
Figure 2 presents the results of the fixed-effects models on town-level violent crime rates by
plotting the main coefficient of interest (β3), which tests whether changes in the outcome variable
differed between treatment and control groups. The top panel of Figure 2 shows the coefficient
from a fixed-effects regression with controls, and we compare this estimate to those obtained
from a fixed-effects regression without controls, below. Table 2 presents the full results.
The results show that Mincome is associated with a decline in violent crime. This is
consistent with our hypotheses regarding inter-partner violence, as well as with the hypothesis
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that a decline in property crime, which we test next, may lead to a reduction in its associated
violent crime (Messner and Rosenfeld 2012; Rosenfeld 2009). More specifically, Mincome is
associated with a change in violent crimes that amounts to 350 fewer violent crimes per 100,000
people compared to other towns. The magnitude of this effect is quite large, considering that
Dauphin’s violent crime levels averaged about 600 per 100,000 people. The lower panels show
that estimates from fixed-effects without control variables slightly overestimate the effect of
Mincome, a result consistent with the fact that Dauphin had a slightly lower crime rate at the
beginning of the series.
<Fig. 2 about here>
<Table 2 about here>

As expected then, we see a significant effect on reported violent crime. What about total
crime? Like Figure 2, Figure 3 presents the results of fixed-effects models by plotting the main
coefficient of interest (β3). Again, the full results are shown in Table 2. Here, relative to similar
town-years, Mincome is associated with a change that amounts to 1,400 fewer total crimes per
100,000 people. The magnitude of this effect is large, although smaller compared to the effect on
violent crime; considering that Dauphin’s overall crime rate averaged about 8,000 per 100,000
people, the change is considerable. Because violent crime comprises just a small portion of the
overall crime rate, this result suggests that Mincome also contributed to reduce other forms of
crime, albeit perhaps not with as large of an effect size as it did for violent crime.
<Fig. 3 about here>
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We hypothesized that Mincome’s effects on total crime might be largely driven by its
impact on property crime. To examine this, we isolate two key components of total crime,
property crime and “other” crime, presented in Figures 4 and 5 (and Table 3). Figure 4 shows
results for property crime and confirms that Mincome is associated with a substantial decline in
the prevalence of this type of crime. This result conforms to a fairly straightforward rational
choice theory of crime à la Gary Becker (1968). Figure 5 shows results for “other crime.” We
find that Mincome is also associated with a decline in this category of crime, but the effect size is
much smaller than that for either property or violent crime, and the estimate does not reach
standard levels of statistical significance. Overall, the results show that Mincome turns out to
reduce property crime. We commit fewer crimes when we have fewer reasons to do so.
<Fig. 4 about here>
<Fig. 5 about here>
<Table 3 about here>
As we note above, much contemporary criminology accepts a direct relationship between
material deprivation and property crime, and this helps to explain our results in Figures 3 and 4.
However, the link between economic variables and violence shown in Figure 2 is harder to
untangle theoretically. And yet the effect on violence is even stronger than the property crime
effect. Our discussion section speculates further on the mechanisms behind the negative
relationship between Mincome and violence.

Robustness tests
Our analyses have limitations, and we conduct two sets of robustness checks to confirm the
sensitivity of our results. One concern is that our results are driven by an unobservable time21
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varying trait that is unique or particular to Dauphin and unrelated to Mincome. We conduct a
placebo test to address this, which consists of switching the treatment years to 1978–1980
(instead of Mincome treatment 1975–1977). Even if Mincome had lingering effects after its
implementation, finding placebo results that resemble the estimates presented above would raise
concerns and potentially challenge our conclusions. Results (available upon request) show no
evidence for an effect of this Mincome placebo on any of our outcome variables.
A second concern is that our set of control towns offers an inadequate comparison group
to proxy a Dauphin counterfactual. This could be true if Dauphin was a unique town within this
set, or a town that was really only comparable to a few of the towns included in the analysis. We
address this concern using a synthetic control method (Abadie et al. 2010; 2015), which has been
developed for small-N quasi-experimental research designs like ours. This method constructs a
synthetic control for the treated unit (Dauphin) as a weighted average of towns in the donor pool
(control towns). The logic of this method is very similar to conventional matching estimators
(see Abadie et al. 2010; 2015 for more details). Results from these analyses confirm the
estimates obtained using fixed-effects regressions for all outcome variables. This full set of
results is available upon request.

6. Discussion
This paper finds a negative association between exogenous Mincome payments and the rates of
total crime and property crime. The most plausible causal explanation reasons that additional
economic resources diminish the appeal of property crime. We also find a strong negative
association between Mincome and violent crime, which does not allow for as intuitive an
explanation. What kind of violence might this be? As noted above, most of the violent crime
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consists of assaults—and not, say, homicide and rape. As also noted above, Statistics Canada at
the time pointed out that most of these offences are domestic in nature. Intimate partner violence
may then be the most plausible candidate as the main kind of violence we see in decline. Here
we revisit the two mechanisms that are most promising on theoretical grounds.
First, it may be the case that financial stress declines with Mincome, and reducing
financial stress reduces the likelihood of a violent incident. Second, it may be the case that
Mincome changes the balance of power within relationships: the option of starting a new singleperson household did not so much increase the actual incidence of exit, but rather the threat of
exit. Here, improvements in bargaining power and the empowerment of women in relationships
could reduce the chance of inter-partner assault. Indeed, in a separate paper we find some survey
evidence from Mincome providing support for both of these mechanisms. Relative to controls,
married women see a reduction in financial stress and disagreement with spouses, and likewise a
range of survey items demonstrate Mincome’s positive treatment effect with respect to women’s
bargaining power (Gonalons-Pons and Calnitsky, Forthcoming).
It is worth noting that on this front there is a basic design feature that distinguishes a
Mincome-style guaranteed annual income from the universal basic income, more often discussed
in the media today. Where the latter is distributed to all individuals, the former is allocated at the
level of the household. It is certainly conceivable for the guaranteed annual income to facilitate
someone’s exit from a household: separating from a partner and collecting payments individually
was an available option for women under Mincome. Some took that option, and others surely
considered it, giving the impact on bargaining power some prima facie plausibility. However,
because the universal basic income is automatically directed to individuals, not households, it
provides not only an exit option, but also resources—and therefore power—directly to people,
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typically women, inside relationships characterized by unequal power dynamics. Allocation to
individuals rather than families diminishes the risk that the more powerful party takes control of
payments. It stands to reason that relative to the guaranteed income, a universal basic income
may be even more likely to generate reductions in inter-partner violence, as it is better positioned
to offset familial power inequalities.
Before moving to the conclusion, we need to briefly discuss the contemporary relevance
of these findings. Can we generalize from the 1970s? Can findings about effects on property
crime and violent crime from the 1970s have any bearing on the contemporary world? With
respect to property crime there is little reason to suspect that the underlying mechanism has
changed; poverty we still have with us, and as such there is no reason to believe that the
economic motivations for property crime have dissolved. What about violent crime? Is there
reason to believe that even if inter-partner violence was the operative mechanism in the
Mincome years, it is likely to be less relevant as a mechanism today? For example, is it not the
case that transformations in the structure of women’s work opportunities have already changed
the shape of domination in families? Perhaps the low-hanging fruit has been grasped, and the
decline in violent assault (Bunge 2002; Sinha 2013) has rendered any potential effects less
meaningful.
These questions cannot be dismissed, but it is important not to overstate the case. It is
true that relationships have changed over time. For example, while husbands continue to be the
modal perpetrators of inter-partner assault, their assault numbers have fallen since the 1990s.
However, over the same period the number of boyfriends reported to police for intimate-partner
violence has risen (H. Johnson 2006). On the whole, some forms of gender-based violence have
fallen since the 1970s, but many persist nonetheless. According to Canada’s General Social
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Survey (GSS) in 2009, the rate of self-reported violent incidents committed against women
nationwide in the previous 12 months was 11.2 percent (Sinha 2013). However, questions about
lifetime prevalence of gender-based violence are not included in the GSS, and naturally these
numbers are much higher. Lifetime prevalence questions were included in Statistics Canada’s
one-off Violence Against Women Survey (1993), the first and only large-scale national survey
designed to address a number of inadequacies in prior surveys. In this survey, about half of all
women—51 percent—reported at least one episode of physical or sexual violence since age 16
(Johnson 1996; Johnson and Dawson 2011). Even if these numbers have fallen since the 1990s,
the Violence Against Women Survey demonstrated that male violence against women was a
common experience, and there is little doubt that lifetime prevalence of gender-based violence
remains widespread.
Furthermore, it is worth taking stock of the context behind the decline in rates of interpartner assault. Why did these changes occur in the first place? One of the key factors has been
the expansion of viable alternatives to domesticity (Kalmuss and Straus 1982; Pollak 2005). The
expansion of labor market opportunities for women had emancipatory effects precisely because it
provided an exit option from traditional patterns of economic dependence on male breadwinners.
Basic income does just this but, arguably, in a far more direct manner. It might be even more
effective than job growth because it is not contingent on the vicissitudes of the market. And in
light of the uncertainties with respect to future job growth, the old strategy of substituting
economic dependence on husbands with economic dependence on bosses may be increasingly
ineffective. Instead of providing only partial exit through poorly remunerated or part-time jobs,
basic income has the potential to provide a direct alternative to domination in family life.

25

Social Problems

Page 26 of 45

Although this mechanism cannot be tested here, it deserves further and broader exploration in
basic income experimentation going forward.15
Finally, in a period marked by new sources of economic insecurity (Hacker et al. 2014;
Kalleberg 2009; Kalleberg 2018), there is good reason to think that financial stress and conflict
related to financial resources continue to be a pervasive social reality. Recent research
(Schneider et al. 2016) has shown that inter-partner violence is linked not only to economic
hardship, but also with economic uncertainty and anxiety. The guaranteed income reduces
economic hardship, but it is designed to respond to economic uncertainty in particular, and as
such there is good reason to view it as an important policy tool to block off a key pathway to
violent incidents. An automatic and regular stream of cash income will very likely serve to
stabilize people’s everyday lives and temper conflict in relationships. In an economic climate
characterized by sharply rising economic insecurity, guarantees of a baseline level of financial
stability may prove to be more relevant than ever.

7. Conclusion
Will this new round of basic income experimentation shed light on these questions about crime
and material welfare? There is reason for moderate skepticism. In the main this is because labor
market impacts continue to be the most important object of study. Indeed, as far as we know,
there is only one example, the Kenya case (Haushofer et al. 2019), where an experiment has
included survey data aimed at collecting evidence on intimate partner violence. Another
experiment (Rhodes 2017) proposes to study crime, perhaps with administrative data. But if
For example, another avenue of related research—which we could not study with this data—might
explore how over a long period, basic income could facilitate marriage delay rather than dissolution.
There is evidence linking marriage delays and reduced violence in relationships (i.e., Dugan, Nagin, and
Rosenfeld 1999).
15
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these issues remain secondary, problems with data collection and experimental design may
emerge. To understand crime and assault, it will be useful for future experiments to collect both
survey data and various kinds of administrative data, and appreciate the shortcomings of each
(Jencks 1991; Johnson 1996, 2016; Johnson and Dawson 2011).
For reasons that are well known, survey respondents may not report violence, especially
for incidents months in the past or when it is an everyday occurrence (see also a summary of
shortcomings of traditional victimization surveys in Johnson and Sacco 1995). And surveys may
under-sample people who experience the highest levels of violence—the homeless population,
for example. On the other hand, police statistics underestimate violence far more than survey
data (H. Johnson 2006). In general, the advantage of police-reported data is its annual nature,
comprehensive geographic coverage, and basis in physical evidence. The central shortcoming is
that it includes only what is reported to police, and this is a major issue in particular for intimate
partner violence and sexual violence (Lievore 2005 provides a summary of the barriers
impacting reporting decisions). It is worth noting, however, that at least with respect to a number
of crime categories, survey data and administrative data often follow similar trends (Kruttschnitt
et al. 2014). And more important for our own paper, even if there are limits to police-reported
data, these are issues that will be consistently present, before, during, and after our experimental
period; there is thus little reason to think that the trends we identify will be impacted by those
limits. As such, even if these data sources do not produce valid evidence, they are likely to be
reliable; future research might need to be content to pursue changing trends rather than accurate
levels.
A related and underrecognized reason for skepticism highlighted by our study is that
analyses such as ours will be impossible in those new experiments testing randomized and
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scattered recipients rather than whole towns. Randomization rules out macro-social data
collection, and insofar as peer effects and social networks are important, data from randomized
trials may underestimate real-world effects. Although our data does not allow us to identify
which particular social interaction mechanisms are in play, spillovers will at least be picked up
where randomized studies assume them out of existence. Moreover, in small experiments survey
data may be required because effects will be too small to be picked up by traditional police
statistics. This is not to suggest that administrative data will be off the table, but it will have to be
collected in creative ways. These are further reasons why experiments ought to consider
Dauphin-style “saturation” approaches to testing basic income (see also Calnitsky 2019; and
Calnitsky and Latner 2017).
The literature around income maintenance programs tends to focus narrowly on the
extent to which income guarantees reduce people’s participation in the formal labor market (see
Levine et al. 2005; and Widerquist 2005). The virtue of looking at the guaranteed income
through a sociological lens is that it forefronts an array of social consequences generated by
programs designed to eliminate poverty (for overviews, see Calnitsky 2017, 2018b). While this
kind of analysis should be of interest to those preoccupied with understanding the diverse effects
of income-maintenance policies, it should be of equal interest to scholars concerned broadly with
crime, violence, and perhaps domination in family life. If sociology can contribute to
transformative social policy by facilitating fuller, more socially tuned analyses of costs and
benefits, future basic income experiments, depending on their design, may in turn benefit
sociology by clarifying the mechanisms through which socioeconomic variables affect crime and
violence.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics, averaged across study period and experimental years
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Figure 1. Descriptive trends in rates of violent crime, total crime, property crime, and “other”
crime
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Figure 2. Coefficient plot of Mincome effect on town-level violent crime
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Figure 3. Coefficient plot of Mincome effect on town-level total crime
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Table 2: Regression models predicting town-level violent crime and total crime
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Figure 4. Coefficient plot of Mincome effect on town-level property crime
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Figure 5. Coefficient plot of Mincome effect on town-level “other” crime
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Table 3: Regression models predicting town-level property crime and “other” crime
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Coefficient plot of Mincome effect on town-level total crime
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Coefficient plot of Mincome effect on town-level property crime
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